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Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers em-
pirical insights on the strategic choice of firms’ owners over the terms of a managerial
compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage
in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether
firms owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either
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product market. Prominent among our results is that firms’ owners choose Relative Perfor-
mance over Profit Revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms’ owners successfully
induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives
which deviate from strict profit maximization.
Keywords: Experimental economics; Oligopoly theory; Managerial delegation; En-
dogenous contracts
JEL Classification: D43; L21
1 Introduction
It is well established that in modern firms, where ownership and management are separated
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), one of the key aspects of corporate governance relates to managerial
compensation (van Witteloostuijn et al., 2007). In this context, owners choose their managers’
compensation contracts so as to motivate them to gain a competitive advantage in the market
(Murphy, 1999; Jensen et al., 2004).1 Given the recent debate regarding managerial remuner-
ation schemes which was triggered after the global financial crisis (See among others Desai,
2012), firms’ owners, corporate managers, policy makers and academics are attempting to dis-
entangle the main reasons that lie behind the emergence of different structures of managerial
incentive contracts.
Several corporate performance measures have been associated with managerial compen-
sation. Early empirical studies (Baker et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lambert et
al., 1991) suggest that CEO compensation is positively associated with profits and revenues.
Moreover, industry-level analyses suggest that contracts combining own profit and revenues
are widely adopted in the CEO compensation practice in US “new economy” firms (Nourayi
and Daroca, 2008), the US electric industry (Duru and Iyengar, 1999) and the US gas util-
ity industry (Agrawal et al., 1991).2 There is also evidence suggesting that top executives’
compensation is based on their “relative performance”, i.e., a manager’s compensation is a
combination of own profits and the relative performance against the rivals’ profits (Gibbons
1At this point, it is useful to bear in mind two alternative interpretations of delegation. According to the
first one, following Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), an owner hires a manager and directs him
via an appropriate incentive contract. The alternative interpretation is the one presented by Miller and Pazgal
(2002). The problem faced by the owner of each firm is to choose the best type of manager among those that
are available, while each manager is committed to behaving in a certain manner by virtue of his personality
type. Kopel and Brand (2012), examine the case in which firms deviate from profit maximization by including
stakeholder interests in their objective function. Recently, Kopel and Marini (2014) developed a model in
which a consumer cooperative was shown to prefer to pay a flat compensation to a manager with an intrinsic
motivation, while a profit maximizing firm delegates through an extrinsic incentive contract.
2The strategic use of managerial compensation contracts combining own profits and revenues has been
introduced in the literature by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas
(1987). In this line of research, an owner has the opportunity to delegate the output decision to his manager
and by offering him an appropriate compensation contract, to direct the manager to a more aggressive behavior
in the market. This forces rival firms to reduce their output.
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and Murphy, 1990; Barro and Barro, 1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992).3 Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) and Joh (1999) find that contracts of this type are widely adopted both in the US and
Japanese manufacturing sector. Regarding the UK, Keasy (2006) suggests that relative share-
holder return growth remains the most popular performance measure linked with executive
compensation.4 Despite this variety in managerial compensation practices, the relevant litera-
ture has mainly focused on different explanations on why delegation is used, while less attention
has been given on the choice of the compensation contracts’ terms.5
Our research is important because, in the real business world, different managerial remu-
neration schemes may arise: some are profit oriented, others are based on sales and some
on relative performance. Therefore, our results offer empirical insights on the choice of the
managerial incentives package as a strategic decision in imperfectly competitive markets. In
particular, we provide a theoretical framework and experimentally test its predictions concern-
ing the choice between a scheme combining own profits and revenues and an alternative one
based on own profits and relative performance. Laboratory data are obtained under two alter-
native settings, depending on the ability of firm owners to commit, or not, on contract types
before choosing their respective contract terms.6 This allows us to test the relative importance
of strategic commitment on specific contract types in a context for which real world data are
naturally unavailable.
The predictions of the theoretical model are the following: First, in equilibrium, firms’
owners choose to compensate their managers with Relative Performance (RP ) contracts, rather
than with Profit-Revenue (PR) based ones. However, if the choice of a managerial scheme and
3Miller and Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005) formalize relative performance contracts.
4Moral hazard issues arising in a strategic delegation context are usually ignored by the relevant literature,
which focuses exclusively on the use of delegation of authority from owners to managers as a credible commitment
for gaining competitive advantage in the market. Yet, a recent strand of the literature considers delegated
managerial decisions under imperfect information (See among others Sheng et al.,2012 and Wang et al., 2013).
5For example, Barcena-Ruiz and Espinosa (1996) show the value of long-term commitment on a given in-
centive contract. Gonza´lez-Maestre (2000) studies the interplay between delegation and divisionalization of the
firm, while Moner-Colonques et al. (2004) predict that multiproduct firms will adopt partial delegation.
6A key assumption in the strategic managerial delegation literature is that firms’ owners commit over the
types of contracts that they choose to compensate their managers. Yet, Manasakis et al. (2010) find that when
there is no such commitment, each type of contract is an owner’s best response to the rival owner’s contract
choice, leading to multiplicity of equilibria.
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the contract terms is simultaneous (two-stage versus three-stage game), both options can be
an equilibrium. Second, the managerial incentive parameters set by RP -compensating owners
direct their managers relatively closer to profit-maximization than the parameters set by PR-
compensating owners do. And third, if the two contract types coexist, an RP -compensated
manager is predicted to set output at a level higher than that set by his PR-compensated rival,
while firm’s output will be higher the lower the firm’s own managerial incentive parameter.
We tested the predictions of the theoretical model in the laboratory implementing the two-
stage and three-stage versions of the model. A total of four 36-subject sessions were run, two
under each scenario. Eighteen owner-manager pairs, labelled as firms, were randomly formed
at the beginning of each session. These pairs were kept fixed throughout the 50 periods of the
session in order to encourage the development of a cooperative relationship between the agents
who formed each firm. In each period, firms were matched into pairs forming nine random
duopolies in order to preserve the one-shot nature of the market game and avoid any collusive
outcomes (Huck et al., 2004; Holt, 1985).
Prominent among our results is that in most cases owners will choose incentives that
deviate from strict profit maximization in imperfectly competitive markets. To be more precise,
regarding the managerial incentive parameters, our results reveal that firms’ owners only rarely
chose to compensate their managers according to their own profits alone. This is in line with
the theory. Moreover, we find that under both treatments, PR-compensating owners set higher
incentive parameters as compared to the RP -ones.
Our experimental findings confirm that under both experimental treatments owners will
more frequently choose RP contracts over PR contracts, in order to obtain competitive advan-
tage over their rivals in the market. This evidence is in line with the theory. We are also able
to contrast the two alternative motives offered by the theoretical analysis for the prevalence
of RP contracts. Our experimental evidence reveals that the prevalence of RP contracts can
be fully explained by the firms owners’ selection of the Pareto-superior equilibrium contract
types. This, in turn, refutes the importance of strategic commitment over contract types for
explaining the prevalence of RP contracts.
Finally, regarding the effects of contract types and managerial incentive parameters on
managers aggressiveness during the market competition, our experimental evidence confirms
that managers will follow a similar pattern of behaviour in setting output to the levels of
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aggressiveness chosen by their owners. In particular, as the managerial incentive parameters
increase, inducing managers to focus more on own profits, managers’ output choices become
less aggressive. That is, managers set lower output when their incentives depend more on their
firms’ profits and less on the alternative objectives of revenue or relative performance. On
the contrary deviation from profit maximization successfully induces a more aggressive output
setting behaviour. This finding is in line with the theory too.7
Our paper contributes to the literature investigating the corporate performance measures
that owners choose to compensate their managers. In a related paper, Huck et al. (2004),
study strategic managerial compensation contracts in a private duopoly. The authors adopt a
discrete strategy space where owners choose among two different contracts. The first contract
(No-Delegation) gives managers incentives for strict own profit-maximization, while the second
contract (Delegation) gives an additional sales bonus. Given the owners’ choices regarding the
types of contracts, managers choose output from a discrete strategy space. Their experimental
evidence suggests that the delegation contract is rarely chosen. Recently, Du et al. (2013)
in an experimental framework examined the use of strategic delegation in a mixed duopoly
where one owner maximizes profits and the rival maximizes social welfare.8 Their experiment
partially verifies the theoretical equilibrium of the delegation game. By taking into account
learning effects, the verification depends on owners gaining experience through prior playing
training sessions with robot managers.
We depart from these papers in several ways. First, in our experiment, owners have a
broader strategy space, regarding the types of contracts from which they choose to compen-
sate their managers. Second, owners have an almost continuous strategy space on the man-
agerial incentive parameter that weighs own profits against either own revenues or relative
7Yet, the output levels are higher than those predicted by the theory. This holds for all cases except for the
output level set by RP -compensated managers in asymmetric contract configurations. However, under universal
RP -rewarding contracts, which is the most frequent contract combination, this deviation is slightly more than
10% of the predicted theoretical level. This is in line with other quantity setting experimental markets (Huck et
al., 1999) and is contrast with a sharp convergence to equilibrium usually reported in price-setting experiments
(Garcia-Gallego, 1998).
8In their setting, owners set incentive contracts that are a linear combination of profits and sales, while the
managers’ choice over output is restricted to values [0,8]. They analyze the choice of the managerial incentive
parameter indirectly, by measuring the level of the corresponding output that is chosen in the second stage by
owners.
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performance. Third, managers select output also from an almost continuous strategy space.
By doing so, we test not only whether owners direct their managers away from strict own
profit-maximization, but also the effects of contracts chosen by owners on output levels set by
managers. Finally, the distinction between the two-stage and the three-stage scenario allows
us, first, to contrast the two alternative motives offered by the theoretical analysis for the
prevalence of RP contracts, and second, to investigate the relative importance of the owners’
commitment over contracts types for their managers, before setting their respective contract
terms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes and briefly analyzes the
theoretical model that leads to a number of hypotheses that will be tested experimentally.
Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results. Finally, Section 5
concludes. The experimental instructions are included in the Appendix.
2 The theoretical framework
We consider a homogeneous good industry where two firms, denoted by i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
compete in quantities. The (inverse) demand function for the final good is given by P (Q) =
A − Q, where Q = q1 + q2 is the aggregate output. Firms produce with constant returns to
scale technologies and have the same constant marginal cost c < A. Hence firm i’s profits are:
Πi = (A− qi − qj − c)qi (1)
In this industry, each firm has an owner and a manager. Following Fershtman and Judd
(1987), “owner” is a decision maker whose objective is to maximize the profits of the firm.
This could be the actual owner, a board of directors, or a chief executive officer. “Managers”
are agents hired by owners to make real time operating decisions concerning output. Following
Straume (2006), we consider that each manager chooses the firm’s output so as to maximize
his compensation which is set according to a contract provided by the owner.
Each owner compensates his firm’s manager according to one of the following two types of
contracts. The first is the Profit-Revenue, PR, contract. Following Fershtman and Judd (1987)
and Sklivas (1987), under this type of contract, the compensation scheme takes a particular
form: manager i is paid in proportion to a linear combination of own profits and revenues.
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More formally, under this type of contract, manager i’s compensation is given by:
CPRi = α
PR
i Πi + (1− αPRi )Ri (2)
where Πi and Ri are firm i’s profits and revenues respectively, and α
PR
i is the managerial
incentive parameter which is chosen optimally by firm i’s owner so as to maximize his profits,
with 0 ≤ αPRi ≤ 1. If αPRi < 1, firm i’s owner directs his manager away from strict profit-
maximization towards including consideration of revenues and thus, manager i becomes a more
aggressive seller in the market. The higher the αPRi is, the higher is the weight that owner i
puts on own profits. If αPRi = 1, manager i’s behaviour coincides with owner i’s objective for
strict profit-maximization.
The second type of contract is the Relative Performance, RP , one. Following Miller and
Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005), under this type of contract, firm i’s owner compensates his manager
by putting a weight αRPi on own profits and a weight (1−αRPi ) on the difference between own
profits and the profits of the rival firm, with 0 ≤ αRPi ≤ 1. Under this type of contract,
manager i’s compensation is given by:
CRPi = α
RP
i Πi + (1− αRPi )(Πi −Πj) (3)
The lower the αRPi is, the higher is the weight that owner i puts on relative performance,
directing, thus, his manager to become a more aggressive seller in the market. If αRPi = 1, the
manager’s behaviour coincides with the owner’s objective for strict profit-maximization.
To investigate the types of managerial compensation contracts that firms’ owners choose
to compensate their managers in equilibrium, we consider a three-stage game with observable
actions, with the following timing. In the first stage, each firm’s owner commits to one of the
two types of contracts, D ∈ {PR,RP}. In the second stage, each owner sets the respective
managerial incentive parameter αDi . In the third stage, managers set output.
An alternative two stage game with observable actions is also considered, according to
which, in the first stage, each owner chooses both the type of contract D and the respective
managerial incentive parameter αDi . In the second stage, managers set output. The latter
captures a situation in which there is no ex-ante commitment over the type of contract that
each owner offers to his manager. The crucial, yet reasonable, assumption here is that the
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type of contract and the contract terms that owner i sets are not observable by the rival owner
before contract-setting is everywhere completed. This alternative game helps us to evaluate
the relative importance of strategic commitment on an owner’s choice of contract type. The
equilibrium concept employed to solve the above games is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Each manager chooses 
his firm’s output 
Each firm’s owner selects the 
type of contract to offer to his 
manager  
Each firm’s owner sets the 
managerial incentive 
parameter of the contract 
Stage 3 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Three stage game configuration 
Each manager chooses 
his firm’s output 
Each firm’s owner selects the 
type of contracts to offer to his 
manager and sets the 
respective managerial incentive 
parameter 
Stage 2 Stage 1 
Two stage game configuration 
Figure 1: Timing of the three- and two-stage games
In the three-stage game, consider first the Universal Profit-Revenue, UPR, configuration
of contracts. In this case, both firms’ owners commit to a PR contract with which they
compensate their managers. In the third stage, manager i chooses qi to maximize his utility
given by eq. (2). The first order condition gives manager i’s reaction function:
qPRi (q
PR
j ; a
PR
i ) =
A− aPRi c− qPRj
2
(4)
Note that manager i, when choosing output, perceives aPRi c as his firm’s marginal produc-
tion cost. Then owner i, by choosing an incentive parameter aPRi < 1, makes his manager
more aggressive, i.e., he directs him to produce output higher than that produced under a
strict profit-maximizing behaviour. Moreover, the lower aPRi is, the more the reaction function
shifts outwards in a parallel way (i.e., keeping its slope fixed at 12).
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Solving the system of reaction functions, the output levels are:
qPRi (a
PR
i , a
PR
j ) =
A− c(2aPRi − aPRj )
3
(5)
Note that
∂qPRi
∂αPRi
< 0 and
∂qPRi
∂αPRj
> 0. In line with the above discussion, the higher the
weight owner i sets on own profits, the lower is the output level chosen by manager i. By
contrast, as the rival firm’s owner weight on own profits increases, the output level chosen by
manager i gets higher. Substituting (5) into (1), we get firms’ profits:
ΠPRi (α
PR
i , α
PR
j ) =
[A− c(2αPRi − αPRj )][A− c(3− αPRi − αPRj )]
9
(6)
In the second stage, each owner i chooses aPRi to maximize Π
PR
i (a
PR
i , a
PR
j ). The first order
condition gives owner i’s reaction function:
aPRi (a
PR
j ) =
−A+ c(6− aPRj )
4c
(7)
Note that managerial incentive parameters are strategic substitutes. A decrease in the rival
owner’s managerial incentive parameter aPRj , makes the owner of firm i to direct his manager
to a less aggressive behaviour (higher aPRi ). Solving the system of reaction functions, the
equilibrium managerial incentive parameters are:9
aPRi =
−A+ 6c
5c
(8)
Plugging aPRi in eq. (5) and (6), firm i’s equilibrium output and profits are:
qPRi =
2(A− c)
5
; ΠPRi =
2(A− c)2
25
(9)
We next consider the Universal Relative Performance, URP,configuration of contracts. In
this case, both firms’ owners commit to an RP contract with which they compensate their
managers. In the third stage, manager i chooses qi to maximize his utility given by eq. (3).
The first order condition gives manager i’s reaction function:
qRPi (q
RP
j ; a
RP
i ) =
A− c− aRPi qRPj
2
(10)
9In order for αPRi ≥ 0, we assume in the sequel that c ≥ A6 .
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Note that manager i, when choosing the output level of his firm, perceives aRPi q
RP
j (instead
of simply qRPj ) as the rival’s output. Then the owner i, by setting an incentive parameter
aRPi < 1, makes his manager more aggressive, i.e., he directs him to produce more than what
is dictated by a strict own profit-maximizing behaviour. Moreover, the lower aRPi is, the more
the reaction function shifts outwards. In particular, it turns around the point (A− c)/2 on the
qRPi axis, with its slope
dqj
dqi
increasing as aRPi decreases.
Solving the system of the reaction functions, the output levels are:
qRPi (α
RP
i , α
RP
j ) =
(2− αRPi ) (A− c)
4− αRPi αRPj
(11)
Note that
∂qRPi
∂αRPi
< 0 and
∂qRPi
∂αRPj
> 0. As expected from our discussion above, the higher the
weight owner i sets on own profits, the lower is the output level chosen by manager i. While the
opposite occurs when the rival firm’s owner increases its weight on own profits. Substituting
(11) into (1), we get firms’ profits:
ΠRPi (α
RP
i , α
RP
j ) =
(
2− αRPi
)
[αRPi (1− αRPj ) + αRPj ] (A− c)2
(4− αRPi αRPj )2
(12)
In the second stage, each owner i chooses aRPi to maximize profits Π
RP
i (a
RP
i , a
RP
j ). The
first order condition gives owner i’s reaction function:
aRPi (a
RP
j ) =
4(1− aRPj )
4− 3aRPj
(13)
As
daRPi
daRPj
< 0, managerial incentive parameters are strategic substitutes here too. A decrease
in the rival owner’s managerial incentive parameter aRPj , makes the owner of firm i to direct
his manager to a less aggressive behaviour (higher aRPi ). From (13) and exploiting symmetry,
we obtain the equilibrium managerial incentive parameters:
aRPi =
2
3
(14)
Plugging aRPi in eq. (11) and (12), firm i’s equilibrium output and profits are:
qRPi =
3(A− c)
8
; ΠRPi =
3(A− c)2
32
(15)
Finally, the Coexistence configuration of contracts is considered. Without loss of generality,
owner i commits to compensate his manager with a PR contract, while owner j commits to
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an RP contract. In the third stage, manager i (j) chooses qi (qj) to maximize his utility given
by eq. (2) ((3)). From the first order conditions, the reactions functions are:10
qpri (q
rp
j ; a
pr
i ) =
A− apri c− qrpj
2
; qrpj (q
pr
i ; a
rp
j ) =
A− c− arpj qpri
2
(16)
Solving the system of first order conditions, output levels are:
qpri (α
pr
i , α
rp
j ) =
A− c(2αpri − 1)
4− αrpj
; qrpj (α
pr
i , α
rp
j ) =
A(2− αrpj )− c(2− αpri αrpj )
4− αrpj
(17)
As above, the weight an owner sets on own profits affects negatively the output level chosen
by his manager, while the rival owner weight on own profits affects it positively:
∂qpri
∂αpri
< 0,
∂qrpj
∂αrpj
< 0, and
∂qrpj
∂αpri
> 0,
∂qpri
∂αrpj
> 0. Substituting (17) into (1), we get firms’ profits:
Πpri (α
pr
i , a
rp
j ) =
[A− c(2αpri − 1)] [A− c(3− 2αpri − αrpj + αpri αrpj )]
(4− αrpj )2
Πrpj (α
pr
i , α
rp
j ) =
[A(2− αrpj )− c(2− αpri αrpj )][A− c(3− 2αpri − αrpj + αpri αrpj )]
(4− αrpj )2
(18)
In the second stage, each owner sets the incentive parameter to maximize its profits. The
respective first order condition gives the owner’s reaction function:
apri (a
rp
j ) =
−Aarpj + c(8− 3arpj )
4c(2− arpj )
; arpj (a
pr
i ) =
4c(1− apri )
A+ c(2− 3apri )
(19)
It can be checked that both reaction functions are negatively sloped. Hence, managerial
incentive parameters are strategic substitutes here too. Solving the system of first order condi-
tions, we obtain the managerial incentive parameters, and by using (17) and (18), the output
levels and profits in equilibrium:
αpri = 1; q
pr
i =
A− c
4
; Πpri =
(A− c)2
16
αrpj = 0; q
rp
j =
A− c
2
; Πrpj =
(A− c)2
8
(20)
Interestingly, the coexistence of contracts implies that the owner offering a PR contract
directs his manager to act as a strict own profit maximizer, while the owner offering an RP
10These expressions are the same (except for notation) as those in (4) and (10), and hence similar comments
apply here too.
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contract endows his manager with the highest level of aggressiveness. The latter manager
cares only about relative profits and not about own profits. Observe that under both universal
contract configurations (UPR and URP ), managers are directed by owners to a more moderate
degree of aggressiveness, yet away from strict own profit maximization.
In the first stage, owners choose simultaneously each to offer a PR or an RP contract to
his manager. Using the equilibrium profit expressions under the UPR, URP and coexistence
of both contracts configurations, we can construct the symmetric 2x2 matrix game. As Πrp1 >
ΠPR1 and Π
RP
1 > Π
pr
1 (and similarly for owner 2’s profits), each owner has a strictly dominant
strategy to offer a RP contract to his manager. Hence, the Universal Relative Performance
contract configuration emerges in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the three-stage
game.11 Intuitively, an RP contract makes a manager’s behaviour less susceptible to strategic
manipulation by the rival manager. Less scope for strategic manipulation reduces the incentives
of the rival firm’s owner to direct his manager towards more aggressive behaviour. Therefore,
the owner who chooses the RP contract for his manager obtains a competitive advantage in
the market, independently of the contract chosen by the rival owner.12
Turning to the two stage game where owners are unable to commit to a specific contract type
before setting its respective contract terms, multiple equilibria arise regarding the type (and
the terms) of contract that each owner chooses.13 Nevertheless, using the Pareto dominance
criterion for equilibrium selection, owners would realize that it is in their mutual interest to
move towards the equilibrium that ensures them the highest profits, that is, the URP contract
11We have assumed throughout that firms have equal marginal costs. Cost asymmetries may disturb the
(RP,RP ) equilibrium but only if they are significant. In the latter case, it can be shown that equilibria with
coexistence of contracts may arise in which, depending on the degree of cost asymmetry, the efficient or the
inefficient firm’s owner chooses a profit-revenues contract.
12Note that if both owners set the managerial incentive parameters equal to 1, equilibrium output level and
profits are qNi =
(A−c)
3
and ΠNi =
(A−c)2
9
, respectively. In the strategy space of Huck et al. (2004), this is
equivalent to the “No-Delegation” case where owners themselves decide over the output levels. It is easy to
check that output (profits) set under any of the managerial compensation contracts discussed above is higher
(lower) than that set in the “No-Delegation” case. Intuitively, owner i, by using a managerial compensation
contract strategically, directs his manager to a more aggressive behavior in order to force the rival manager
to reduce output. Because both owners act in the same way at the game’s contract stage, firms end up in a
prisoners’ dilemma situation, which leads to lower profits for each of them.
13For a formal proof see Manasakis et al. (2010).
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configuration equilibrium. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in the two stage game too,
each owner chooses to compensate his manager with an RP contract (for further details see
Manasakis et al., 2010). The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 1: (i) In the three stage game, it is a strictly dominant strategy for each
owner to choose a Relative Performance contract, and thus the Universal Relative Performance
contract configuration arises in the unique equilibrium of the game.
(ii) In the two stage game, multiple contract type and terms equilibria exist, yet applying
the Pareto dominance criterion, the Universal Relative Performance contract configuration is
expected to be selected by the owners in equilibrium.
We concentrate now on the hypotheses which will be tested with our experimental design.
We begin by considering the owners’ contract type choices with which they will compensate
their managers. Our theoretical analysis predicts universal adoption of RP contracts in both
the 2-stage and 3-stage games.
However, if coordination on one of multiple equilibria in the 2-stage game requires too
much in terms of owners’ rationality, we would expect a higher frequency of RP contracts in
the 3-stage game. Otherwise, RP contracts should be adopted in both games with similar
frequencies.
Thus, from a practical point of view, comparing the 2-stage and 3-stage games allows us
to evaluate the role of strategic commitment to a contract type before choosing its respective
terms. The above lead to the following hypothesis that will be tested experimentally:
HYPOTHESIS 1: (H1.1) Relative Performance contracts will be preferred by owners
over Profit-Revenue ones and (H1.2) The frequency of Relative Performance contracts will
be lower (higher) in the absence (presence) of owners’ commitment over the contract type
before choosing its respective contract terms.
Given the above arguments, it is straightforward that the equilibrium contracts’ managerial
incentive parameters should be set at a level such that RP -compensating owners gain higher
profits than the PR-ones. This can be formalized in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: (H2.1) Under universal adoption of each type of contract, Relative
Performance-compensating owners set managerial incentive parameters at a level higher than
that set by Profit-Revenue-compensating owners. (H2.2) In asymmetric contract configurations,
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the aforementioned ranking is expected to be reversed. (H2.3) No difference is expected between
the two stage and three stage games.
Firms’ output is expected to be higher under UPR contracts than under URP contracts.
The opposite ranking holds for firms’ profits. This explains why the latter equilibrium is
more profitable for firms’ owners than the former. In asymmetric contract configurations, an
RP -compensated manager sets output at a level higher than that set by his PR-compensated
rival manager. Furthermore, according to expressions (5), (11) and (17), and the follow up
discussion, own output should react negatively to increases in a firm’s own managerial in-
centive parameter and positively to the rival firm’s incentive parameter, under all contract
configurations. The above can be summarized in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: (H3.1)Compared to the case of Universal Relative Performance con-
tracts, output will be higher under Universal Profit-Revenue contracts. Whenever the two
contract types coexist, an RP -compensated manager is predicted to set output at a level higher
than that set by his PR-compensated rival. (H3.2) A firm’s output will be higher the lower the
firm’s own managerial incentive parameter and the higher the rival firm’s incentive parameter.
3 Experimental design
We have tested the predictions of the theoretical model outlined above in a laboratory exper-
iment.
A total of 144 subjects participated in the sessions. They were volunteers recruited among
2nd and 3rd year students enrolled in the Business and Human Resources degrees at the
Universitat Jaume I (Castello´n, Spain) according to standard protocols used in the Laboratori
d’Economia Experimental (LEE). Each session lasted approximately 100 minutes.
The experiment was organized under two treatments. A total of four 36-subject sessions
were run, two under each treatment. In the first treatment, labelled as 3-stage game, the choice
of contract type precedes the choice of the managerial incentive parameter. Then, managers set
output. In the second treatment, labelled as 2-stage game, owners choose simultaneously both
the type of contract with which to compensate their managers and the respective managerial
incentive parameter, before managers decide on their firms’ output. Incentive parameters were
chosen between 0 and 1 (inclusive) using up to two decimal digits, whereas output was chosen
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among the integers in the range between 0 and 500. The experiment was programmed using
the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher, 2007).
At the beginning of each session written instructions were given to the subjects and each of
them was randomly assigned the role of an owner or a manager. Eighteen owner-manager pairs,
labelled as firms, were randomly formed at the beginning of each session. These pairs were
kept fixed throughout the 50 periods of the session in order to encourage the development of a
cooperative relation between the agents who formed each firm. Nine duopolies were randomly
formed in each period in order to preserve the one-shot nature of the market game. In order
to increase the number of completely independent observations per session, matching occurred
within three groups of 6 owner-manager pairs (firms), that is, three independent matching
groups of 12 subjects each. However, this precise detail was not known by the subjects who
had an additional difficulty to guess the total group size and assess the likelihood of being re-
matched with the same firm in two different periods, given that the computer network of the
LEE is installed in two distant rooms between which there is no possibility of visual contact.
No significant difference was found across matching groups within each treatment and, thus,
data from the same treatment were pooled together. Following this design, a total of three
totally independent observations per session is guaranteed by the fact that strategies and the
history experienced by each subject were never contaminated nor did they contaminate decision
making within the other two matching groups. Therefore, in a very strict statistical sense, our
conclusions are based on behaviour within six totally independent groups per treatment.
In order to facilitate learning in the quantity-setting stage, owners could change their
managers’ compensation contract every 3 periods, during the first 30 periods and in every
period, during the last 20 periods.14 Before subjects made their decisions in the second and
third stages of the game they were informed on previous stage actions by other players in the
same market. At the end of each period, each subject’s feedback included full information on
strategies and outcomes of all players in the same market. No other decision making aid was
available to them.
The four sessions were run on two dates. The order between the 2-stage and the 3-stage
14Previously, this format has been efficiently implemented as a learning facilitating device in several experi-
ments on multistage oligopolies such as in Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2011), Camacho-Cuena et al. (2005) and
Fata´s-Juber´ıas et al. (2013).
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session was changed across the two dates to minimize the probability that a subject could
anticipate the treatment that would be implemented should any information have been trans-
mitted from one session to another. Each subject participated in one session only. Therefore,
sessions 1 and 4 correspond to the 3-stage treatment, while sessions 2 and 3 belong to the
2-stage treatment.
The total amount spent on subject payoffs was 2, 739 euros which implies slightly above
19 euros per subject earnings, ranging between 7.3 and 29.6 euros (an owner subject in a
3-stage treatment and an owner-subject in a 2-stage treatment respectively). Subjects in the
3-stage treatment received slightly lower payments than in the 2-stage one (18.7 and 19.3 euros
respectively). An exchange rate of 1 euro per 80, 000 EXCUs was used.
Following closely the contracts studied in the theoretical model, the contract schemes for
the experiment were designed after a series of pilot sessions in order to guarantee that subjects
with different roles could earn similar expected rewards. In particular, the PR contract took
the following formula: 20.000 EXCUs as a fixed salary plus a half of a linear combination
between the profits and the revenues of the firm. The respective formula for the RP contract
was: 20.000 EXCUs as a fixed salary plus a half of a linear combination between the firm’s
profits and the difference between the firm’s profits and the profits of the rival firm.15
The model’s parameter values implemented in the experiment were A = 1000 and c =
200. Under this set of parameters, in the Universal PR equilibrium, both owners should set
αPRi = 0.2 and managers should set the corresponding equilibrium output levels at q
PR
i = 320.
The respective values in the Universal RP equilibrium are αRPi = 0.666 and q
RP
i = 300. The
equilibrium contract terms and output levels when owner i chooses the PR contract while j
chooses the RP one are:
[
αPRi , α
RP
j , q
PR
i , q
RP
j
]
= [1, 0, 200, 400].
A strict test of the theoretical model should aim at comparing the observed data on contract
types, contract terms and outputs to the aforementioned theoretical predictions. However, real
human agents learn from trial-and-error strategies and may make systematic mistakes due to
a number of reasons.16 Thus, we focus mainly on the test of the predictions provided by the
15For the instructions given to subjects, see the Appendix.
16A vast literature has been dedicated to various factors that may be responsible for observed shortcomings
of human behavior in complex environments, such as mis-perception of feedback (Paich and Sterman, 1993;
Sterman, 1994), limitations in subjects’ learning when exposed to strategic complexity (Richards and Hays,
1998), or multi-task decision making (Kelly, 1995). A number of factors that favor subjects’ improvement of
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qualitative hypotheses H1−H3 stated in the previous section.
4 Experimental results
Let us now proceed with the presentation of the experimental results. We begin with the
overall descriptive statistics of our experiment.
4.1 Overall descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides aggregate adoption frequencies for the two contract types. While the ag-
gregation of data does not allow us to test any specific hypothesis, we obtain a first picture
indicating that RP contracts were adopted in over 70% of the cases in both treatments. We
proceed now with a more detailed analysis of the data taking into account the different possible
contract configurations arising from the choices of both owners.
Table 1: Contract adoption frequencies
Treatment
2-Stage 3-Stage Both
Contract Type* RP PR RP PR RP PR
Relative Frequency 73.3% 26.7% 70.9% 29.1% 72.1 27.9%
* Profit-Revenue Contract =PR, Relative Performance Contract =RP
4.2 Types of contracts and contract configurations
Regarding the total number of occasions in which each contract type was adopted, we find
that, in both treatments, the frequency of RP adoption was significantly higher than that
performance have, also, been identified. For example, trial-and-error algorithms have been shown to facilitate
convergence of the strategies played by uninformed subjects toward symmetric, full-information equilibrium
predictions, as shown in Garcia-Gallego (1998) for the case of a price-setting oligopoly. While full convergence
near the theoretical benchmark is obtained in the symmetric single-product setting of Garcia-Gallego (1998),
the introduction of multiproduct firms in Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2001) or the asymmetry in Garcia-
Gallego et al. (2004) provide sufficiently unfavorable environments for the hypothesis of convergence to the
theoretical prediction to be rejected.
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of PR. More specifically, RP vs. PR contracts were chosen 1320 vs. 480 times in the 2-
stage treatment and 1277 vs. 523 times in the 3-stage treatment. However, the prediction
of universal adoption of RP contracts is confirmed less frequently than these numbers may
suggest. To see this, we refer to Table 2.
What we are really interested in is to investigate whether the combination of owners’ con-
tract choices is as predicted by the equilibria of the theoretical model. As shown in Table
2, more than half of our experimental duopolies took place under Universal RP contracts.
This holds for both the 2-stage (988/1800 = 54.89%) and the 3-stage (932/1800 = 51.78%)
treatments. Contrary to this, the Universal PR configuration received scarce support (8.22%
for the 2-stage and 9, 89% for the 3-stage). In fact, the frequency of Universal PR is ap-
proximately one fourth of the frequency of Coexistence of the two contract types, PRRP and
RPPR, in the same market17.18
Table 2: Owners’ choices of contract types
Treatment UPR URP PRRP & RPPR
2-stage 8.22% 54.89% 36.89%
3-stage 9.89% 51.78% 38.33%
Total 9.06% 53.33% 37.61%
Note also that firms’ owners only rarely chose to compensate their managers in a way
directing them to strict own profit maximization. More specifically, only in 4% (6%) of the
contracts in the 3-stage (2-stage) treatment, owners set the managerial incentive parameter
equal to one. This result comes in sharp contrast to the experimental evidence of Huck et al.
(2004). They find that the “No-Delegation” strategy is chosen with a relative frequency of
more than 66% in all their treatments.
These results clearly confirm Hypothesis H1.1. Furthermore, we find that the frequency of
RP contracts is not higher in the when owners commit over the contract type before choos-
17Hereafter, PRRP indicates the configuration where owner 1 chooses the PR contract and owner 2 chooses
the RP contract. The opposite holds for RPPR.
18A χ2 test (p < 0.001) has been used to confirm the significance of the difference between the aforementioned
observed frequencies and a random distribution of strategy pairs uniformly across the corresponding outcomes
of the game in the contract stage.
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ing its respective contract terms. This result indicates that the prevalence of the Universal
RP configuration over the Universal PR alternative one can be fully explained by the sub-
jects’ selection of the Pareto-superior equilibrium contract types and refutes the importance
of strategic commitment over contract types for explaining the prevalence of RP contracts.
Therefore, we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 2: 1. Under both treatments, Relative Performance contracts are significantly
more frequent than Profit-Revenue ones (confirming H1.1). 2. The adoption frequency of Rel-
ative Performance contracts does not vary across the 2-stage and 3-stage treatments (rejecting
H1.2).
Hence, our evidence reveals that under both experimental treatments owners will more
frequently choose RP contracts over PR contracts. Therefore, the pro-competitive attribute
of relative performance-based incentives is recognized and appropriately used by firm owners
wishing to gain a competitive advantage in the market.
It is also interesting to see the dynamics of contract adoption frequencies. Figure 2 presents
the evolution of RP contract adoption in the two treatments, starting from below 40% in period
1, and reaching frequencies close to 90% in period 50. Figure 3 presents the same data broken
down by contract combination. Figure 3 shows that in both treatments, Universal PR adoption
represents a small and rather stable proportion of choices. The coexistence of both contracts
decreases over time while Universal adoption of RP contracts increases up to around 3/4 of
the cases.
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Figure 2: Evolution of individual RP contract adoption.
Figure 3: Evolution of Contract Combinations.
4.3 Managerial incentive parameters
Let us now present our findings regarding owners’ choices of managerial incentive parameters.
We present our evidence in Table 3 and Figure 4.
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Table 3: Owners’ choices of managerial incentive parameters
Configuration UPR URP PRRP RPPR
Predicted α 0.200 0.666 1 0
2-stage Mean α 0.579 0.471 0.571 0.472
St. dev. 0.242 0.254 0.285 0.247
3-stage Mean α 0.611 0.485 0.620 0.485
St. dev. 0.278 0.277 0.292 0.276
Figure 4: Evolution of incentive parameter by contract combination.
Recall that our theoretical analysis predicts αPRi = 0.2 and α
RP
i = 0.666. Regarding the
symmetric configurations of contracts, our experimental evidence leads to the following ob-
servations. First, under universal contract adoption in both treatments, the average incentive
parameter set by PR-compensating (RP -compensating) owners was higher (lower) than the
predicted one. This implies that PR-compensating (RP -compensating) owners’ intention to-
wards profit-maximization was stronger (weaker) than predicted. Figure 4 shows a dynamic
picture of these observations, depicting observed incentive parameters against their respective
theoretical values (plotted as an horizontal line). No systematic trend is observed in any of
these parameter series, whereas fluctuations in the case of universal PR contracts are due to
the small and noisy sample under this configuration.
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In absolute values, the deviation of observed incentive parameters from the respective
predicted equilibrium values for PR contracts was twice the deviation for RP contracts.
Interestingly enough, within each treatment, PR-compensating owners set, on average,
incentive parameters higher than those set by the RP -compensating ones.19 This is in contrast
to the theory’s predictions and implies that PR-compensated managers were directed relatively
closer to profit-maximization than RP -compensated ones. Note also that for both contract
types, the difference in incentive parameters across treatments (2-stage vs 3-stage) is not
statistically significant.20
The evidence regarding the relatively higher managerial incentive parameters set by PR-
compensating owners can be rationalized as follows: PR-compensating owners, anticipating the
fierce market competition that their contract choices would give rise to, might realize that it is
in their mutual interest to direct their managers towards a relatively less aggressive behaviour
(higher αPRi ), so as to increase their profits. Thus, in order to mitigate this Stackelberg
warfare, they set relatively high managerial incentive parameters, directing their managers to
a less aggressive behaviour than RP -compensating owners did.
In asymmetric configurations, our theory predicts that the PR-compensating owner sets
αPRi = 1 and theRP - one sets α
RP
j = 0. Regarding the asymmetric contract configurations, our
experimental evidence leads to the following three observations. First, under both treatments,
the average incentive parameter set by PR-compensating (RP -compensating) owners was lower
(higher) than the predicted one. Second, as in the symmetric contract configurations, in mixed
contract schemes too,PR-compensating owners set, on average, incentive parameters higher
than those set by the RP -compensating ones.21 This holds for both treatments, it is in line
with the theoretical model’s prediction, and implies that RP -compensated managers were
19Within each treatment, the difference in incentive parameters across contract types is significant, as shown
by a Mann-Whitney test comparing medians of independent groups (p = 0.033 for the 2-stage treatment and
p = 0.025 for the 3-stage treatment).
20Given a PR contract, the statistical significance of the difference in incentive parameters across treatments
(2-stage vs 3-stage) is rejected by a Mann-Whitney test comparing the medians of independent groups (p =
0.25). The respective test for an RP contract rejects the statistical significance of incentive parameters across
treatments too (p = 0.48).
21Within each treatment, the difference in incentive parameters across contract types is significant, as shown
by a Mann-Whitney test comparing medians of independent groups (p = 0.038 for the 2-stage treatment and
p = 0.019 for the 3-stage treatment).
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directed relatively closer to profit-maximization than PR-compensated ones. Third, for both
contract types, the difference in incentive parameters across treatments (2-stage vs. 3-stage)
is not statistically significant. In fact, the incentive parameters in the asymmetric contract
structures are very close to those reported in the symmetric contract configurations.22
The most striking pattern observed in the evidence reported so far is that given a contract
type, owners set very similar incentive parameters across treatments. More specifically, PR-
compensating owners fix αPRi around 0.57 − 0.62, while RP -compensating owners fix αRPi
around 0.47− 0.48. In fact, these values do not depend on the contract type used by the rival
owner or on the rival owner’s contract observability (3-stage treatment vs. 2-stage treatment).
While the observed incentive parameters deviate from their corresponding theoretical values23,
some of the predictions contained in Hypothesis 2 are confirmed. More specifically:
Proposition 3: 1. The prediction of the theory (H2.1) concerning the relatively higher
incentive parameters (i.e., lower aggressiveness) set by Relative Performance-compensating
owner pairs, over Profit-Revenue compensating owner pairs, is not confirmed, whereas the
prediction (H2.2) concerning the relatively lower incentive parameters (i.e., higher aggressive-
ness) set by Relative Performance-compensating owners, over their Profit-Revenue rivals, is
confirmed. 2. The managerial incentive parameter set by an owner is independent of the con-
tract used by the rival owner and of whether the rival owner’s contract was observed or not
before the contract terms were chosen (confirming H2.3).
One important implication arises from Proposition 3: That is in most cases owners will
strategically choose incentives that deviate from strict profit maximization in imperfectly com-
petitive markets so as to gain competitive advantage over their rivals.
22The significance of the corresponding differences is rejected by the respective Mann-Whitney tests obtaining
p− values such that p > 0.5 in all cases.
23For both symmetric configurations, there is a systematic deviation of observed incentive parameters from
the respective predicted equilibrium values, upwards for Profit-Revenue contracts and downwards for Relative
Performance contracts. For asymmetric configurations, there is a systematic deviation of observed incentive pa-
rameters from the respective predicted equilibrium values, downwards for Profit-Revenue contracts and upwards
for Relative Performance contracts.
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4.4 Output levels
Finally, we focus on the effects of contract types and managerial incentive parameters on output
levels. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics.
Recall that our theoretical results predict qRPi = 300 and q
PR
i = 320 in the two symmetric
configurations, while when owner i chooses the PR contract and j chooses the RP one, the
prediction is: qPRi = 200 and q
RP
j = 400. As shown in Table 4, for both symmetric con-
tract configurations, the output levels set in the experiment exceed our equilibria predictions,
whereas, for asymmetric configurations, this is true only for PR-compensated managers. In
fact, in asymmetric configurations, RP -compensated managers set quantities well below the
corresponding equilibrium level. Therefore, the deviations of output from equilibrium can-
not be uniformly attributed to some subject-specific bias or the framing of our setup as a
competitive market environment.24 Furthermore, comparing overall output levels with output
corresponding to the subgame perfect equilibria may be misleading because it ignores that
conditional optimality of output choices must be viewed with respect to the actual decisions
in the preceding stages.
Table 4: Managers’ choices on output levels
Configuration UPR URP PRRP RPPR
Predicted q 320 300 200 400
2-stage Mean q 364.608 358.725 359.241 346.271
St. dev. 106.741 98.922 95.029 93.334
3-stage Mean q 347.905 359.505 343.177 355.357
St. dev. 99.829 90.662 94.548 87.498
In Table 5 we present the average deviation of the incentive parameter from its equilibrium
prediction, as well as the absolute and relative deviations of output and profit from the corre-
sponding equilibria conditional on the observed incentive parameters. Contrary to Harrison’s
(1989) “flat max” critique, according to which objective functions may be too flat near the op-
timum to give an informative feedback to subjects, we observe that even moderate deviations
24This could have been the effect of using the word “rival” when referring to the other firm or the explicit
encouragement to maximize own profit in the instructions.
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from equilibrium output have caused significant deviations from the corresponding equilibrium
profits. Even in the most frequently observed configuration of URP , a relatively high profit
loss of 59% is observed under both treatments, despite the fact that the relative deviation of
quantity is the lowest (13-14%) among all contract configurations. This implies that man-
agers may have attributed some exceptionally low earnings to the contracts they had been
offered rather than to their own wrong decisions or to their interaction with other managers
in the market. Subsequently, the owners’ decisions have also diverged from the corresponding
equilibrium incentive parameters due to the noisy choices of managers and the little number
of observations under some contract configurations. We consider as evidence in favor of this
conjecture the fact that deviations of the incentive parameter from the corresponding equilib-
rium values have been smaller in the case of URP , which has occurred more frequently, giving
owners more feedback from past actions.
Table 5: Average deviation from equilibrium choices conditional on alpha
2-Stage 3-Stage
Deviation UPR URP PRRP RPPR UPR URP PRRP RPPR
alpha* (α) 0.37 -0.19 -0.42 0.47 0.41 -0.18 -0.38 0.48
quantity (q) 69.8 35.5 82.4 34.2 55.2 38.8 70.8 51.5
relative deviation 25% 13% 31% 14% 21% 14% 28% 20%
Firm Π (in 000’s) -48.0 -28.7 -26.9 -38.2 -36.2 -27.8 -27.4 -36.1
relative deviation -77% -59% -50% -61% -56% -59% -51% -55%
* The observed deviation in alpha is with respect to the SPNE alpha.
Figure 5 depicts output dynamics within each contract combination. Apart from the afore-
mentioned divergence from theoretical predictions, we observe that output levels exhibit per-
sistent oscillations over the 50 periods of the experiment.
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Figure 5: Evolution of quantity by contract combination.
A remaining question concerns the response of output to a given contract and a specific
incentive parameter. Panel data analysis is a useful tool for dealing with the temporal and
individual dimensions of our experimental data. We report here the results of a Prais and
Winsten correlated panel regression for quantity. A Hausman χ2(11) test value of 5.78 does
not allow us to reject that the difference in the coefficients is not systematic, hence we use a
random effects model.
Using a test for serial correlation, we reject the null of no autocorrelation: χ2(1)=25.65.
Moreover, due to the fact that we grouped the firms into matching groups where they play
against each other, there will be contemporaneous correlation effects.
The presence of heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation in our
data drives us to choose a panel corrected standard errors estimation method with a panel
specific AR(1) structure of the form:
quantityit = β0 + β1 · alphait + β2 · other_alphait + εit, (21)
where εit = ρi · εit−1.
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Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 95% Conf. Interval
constant 373.34 5.89 63.42 0.000 [361.80, 384.88]
upr -32.63 17.52 -1.86 0.063 [-66.97, 1.72]
prrp -4.44 12.61 -0.35 0.725 [-29.15, 20.26]
rppr -26.10 10.38 -2.51 0.012 [-46.45, -5.75]
alpha -27.99 8.67 -3.23 0.001 [-44.98, -10.99]
alpha upr 46.33 23.91 1.94 0.053 [-0.52, 93.19]
alpha prrp -2.99 16.96 -0.18 0.860 [-36.23, 30.25]
alpha rppr 16.81 13.75 1.22 0.221 [-10.14, 43.77]
oth alpha -12.54 7.08 -1.77 0.077 [-26.41, -1.34]
oth alpha upr 13.41 21.95 0.61 0.541 [-29.60, 56.42]
oth alpha prrp 15.99 14.47 1.11 0.269 [12.36, 44.36]
oth alpha rppr 18.95 13.35 1.42 0.156 [-7.22, 45.11]
Table 6: Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) for Quantity.
Group variable: firmid; Time variable: period; Number of obs = 3,600; Number of groups = 72;
Panels: correlated (balanced); Autocorrelation: panel-specific AR(1); Obs. per group: 50; Estimated
covariances = 2,628; Estimated autocorrelations = 72; Estimated coefficients = 12; R2 = 0.57; Wald
χ2(11) = 25.62; Prob > χ2 = 0.0074; ρi = 0.389, 0.308, 0.450, 0.426, 0.377, ..., 0.350.
Table 6 presents the estimates of a model in which output choice is explained by own and
rival incentive parameters for each contract combination. The basic contract configuration is
Universal RP because it was the most frequently observed. Hence, constant, alpha, and other
alpha refer to this configuration, while all other estimated parameters measure the size and
significance of the difference in the parameters estimated with respect to this basic config-
uration. The results confirm that output reacts to the incentive parameter in the expected
way: as the incentive parameter increases, inducing managers to focus more on own profit,
output choices become less aggressive. In fact, the estimated coefficient (-27.98, p=0.001) does
not significantly vary across different contract configurations.25 Therefore, the more manager
25For Universal PR, we have very few observations and the difference in the coefficients is not significant at
5%.
26
incentives depend on their firms’ profits, the lower the quantity they set.
With regard to the predicted effect (second part of H3.2) of the rival’s incentive parameter
on a firm’s output choice, we obtain no significant evidence.
The estimated model can also help us address the first part of the third hypothesis concern-
ing the ranking of output choices across different contract configurations. We observe that the
hypothesis is rejected, especially because in mixed contract configurations, RP -compensated
managers set (alpha’s being equal) significantly lower output than their PR-compensated rivals
(-26.10, p=0.012).
In fact, output has, generally speaking, been invariant to alternative contract configura-
tions. These results suggest an overall rejection of Hypothesis 3.1.
This may be a consequence of poor learning in the final stage of the game due to noisy
feedback from the two preceding stages.
Summarizing the aforementioned discussion on output reactions to contract types and terms
we state:
Proposition 4: Output has reacted in the expected way to the terms of a firm’s own
contract (confirming the first part of H3.2). Other reactions do not systematically follow the
pattern predicted by H3.
Therefore we can report that our experimental evidence confirms that managers will follow
a similar pattern of behaviour to the levels of aggressiveness chosen by the owners. To be more
specific, when owners choose less aggressive incentive levels (alphas), managers’ output choices
become less aggressive. That is, managers set lower output when their incentives depend more
on their firms’ profits and less on the alternative objectives of revenue or relative performance.
On the contrary deviation from profit maximization successfully induces a more aggressive
output setting behaviour.
5 Concluding Remarks
The ongoing discussion considering managerial remuneration schemes initiated by the recent
collapse of the housing market bubble in the US, has increased the need to examine the
emergence of the alternative managerial incentive schemes under a behavioural prism. The
experimental approach adopted here allows us to build a bridge between the standard neoclas-
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sical approach to oligopoly delegation and behavioural data from a population of human agents
who have certainly not used any explicit optimization rule, but rather, a noisy learning from
trial-and-error. In the lack of industry-wide empirical data, our results offer some experimental
insights on the choice among alternative managerial incentives packages as a strategic decision
in imperfectly competitive markets.
With respect to the specific framework studied here, our main finding is that Relative Per-
formance contracts were more frequently chosen by owners than Profit-Revenue ones, a result
which is in line with the theory. Moreover, the prevalence of RP contracts can be fully ex-
plained by the firms owners’ selection of the Pareto superior equilibrium contracts, and thus, it
does not depend on whether firms’ owners can commit, or not, to specific contract types before
choosing their respective terms. Our experimental evidence further suggests that, in contrast
to the theoretical prediction, in symmetric contract configurations, PR-compensating own-
ers direct their managers relatively closer to profit-maximization than the RP -compensating
owners do. In line with the theory, the same phenomenon occurs under asymmetric contract
configurations. Finally, output levels set in the experiment tend to exceed their theoretical
predicted values. Hence, managerial contracts and incentive parameters chosen by the firms’
owners result in a Stackelberg warfare fiercer than what the theory predicts.
Our results indicate that deviation from profit maximization successfully induces a more
aggressive output setting behaviour. Further, the pro-competitive role of relative performance-
based incentives is recognized and appropriately used by firm owners wishing to gain a compet-
itive advantage in the market. In fact, this finding is particularly interesting for both theory
and decision making by firms in the real world, because it is obtained in a far more realistic
environment than that of fully rational players assumed in theory. Equally interesting for
both theorists and decision makers is the non significance of revealing the contract type before
choosing the contract terms. Thus, the positive effect of relative performance-based rewards
on firms’ profits is sufficient for this type of contracts to prevail over the profit-revenue alterna-
tive. Given that it is usually impossible to identify the effects of different strategic variables on
specific stages of the decision making process, our experiment constitutes a unique source of ev-
idence on specific predictions of oligopoly delegation theories. The noise in the quantity-setting
stage has added a further challenge on the assumptions of the theory. In such a framework, the
adoption of relative performance incentives and the effectiveness of the contract term param-
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eter to induce more aggressive market behaviour are particularly positive findings regarding
the links between the theory and more complex environments with real human agents. Our
experimental findings offer an empirical confirmation of the strategic delegation theory that in
oligopolistic environments if owners are using pro-competitive incentives they trigger a more
aggressive behaviour by their managers.
Since the paper is taken to experimentation, a very natural element in real life is the
presence of asymmetric firms in industries. For example, firms could differ in costs. Does it
change the result in that case? Do we get a scenario where if the costs differentials between
the two firms exceed a threshold, will one firm will choose optimally one type of contract and
the other would choose a different one or the current result will still hold?
In the present paper we restricted attention to firms producing with the same technology.
However, in real life the presence of asymmetric firms in industries is widespread. The theory
predicts that under cost asymmetries, firms’ owners may choose different contracts to offer to
their managers. It will be an interesting direction for future research to test experimentally
these theoretical predictions.
In addition, we restricted attention to contracts combining either own profits and revenues
or own profits and relative performance. Yet, there is evidence suggesting that the CEOs
compensation is linked with own market share (Peck, 1988; Borkowski, 1999). Ritz (2008) and
Jansen et al. (2007) formalize contracts combining own profits and own market share. Thus,
an interesting direction for future experimental research could be to expand the firms owners’
strategy space by allowing them to compensate their managers with contracts combining own
profits and own market share as well.
6 Appendix: Experiment instructions (translated from Span-
ish)
6.1 Owner Instructions (2-stage treatment)
Your decisions in this experiment will help us study human behaviour in specific economic con-
texts. The experiment is financed by public research funds. Read these instructions carefully,
taking into account that a better understanding of the decision making context will help you
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earn more money and generate more reliable and, thus, useful data.
You are the owner of one of the two firms selling a given product. You will delegate the
output decision of your firm to a manager whom you have hired for this purpose.
You will have to decide on the compensation method which your firm will adopt to remu-
nerate your firm’s manager. Your decisions in each period will become public information to
all agents involved in the same market before output decisions are made. Managers will have
to take these decisions as given and then fix their firm’s output. Contracts may be of the
following types:
Contract Type 1: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a fixed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the firm’s profits and the firm’s revenues.
C1 = 20000 +
1
2
· (α ·Π + (1− α) ·Revenue)
Choosing the value of alpha you can vary the weight given by your firm to each of these
two objectives (profit and revenue) in the variable compensation of the firm’s manager.
Contract Type 2: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a fixed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the firm’s profits and the difference between your firm’s and
the rival’s profits.
C2 = 20000 +
1
2
· (α ·Π + (1− α) · [Π−Πother])
Choosing the value of alpha you can vary the weight given by your firm to each of these two
objectives (profit and difference in profits) in the variable compensation of the firm’s manager.
When choosing the contract terms you should take into account that your earnings will be:
a fixed amount of 20.000 EXCUs plus the firm’s profit.
The market will take place for 50 subsequent periods. In each one of them, following your
choice of contract and that of the rival firm’s owner managers will make output decisions
simultaneously choosing output levels between 0 and 500 product units. You may change your
manager’s compensation method every 3 periods during the first 30 periods and every period
after period 30.
The manager of your firm will be randomly assigned to you once and will be kept fixed
throughout the experiment. In each period, you will form a market with a (different) single
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rival firm which will be chosen randomly among the firms formed by the participants of this
experiment in the same way as your firm.
Your objective is to maximize your cumulative compensation. The more EXCUs you earn
the higher will be your payment in cash at the end of the session. We give you a fixed initial
payment of 100.000 EXCUs which will be added to your earnings from the experiment. The
exchange rate is 1 euro for every 80,000 EXCUs.
Only for the 3-stage treatment: You and the owner of the rival firm will first know the
contract chosen by each one of you and then you will decide on the value of alpha. Only after
these two decisions have been made by owners, the managers receive information on contract
types and incentive parameters chosen in order to make their firms output decisions.
Thank you for your participation and remember that, once these instructions are read, any
communication or action which is not controlled by the organizers is prohibited until payments
in cash have been made at the end of the experiment.
6.2 Manager Instructions (both treatments)
Your decisions in this experiment will help us study human behaviour in specific economic con-
texts. The experiment is financed by public research funds. Read these instructions carefully,
taking into account that a better understanding of the decision making context will help you
earn more money and generate more reliable and, thus, useful data.
You are the manager of one of the two firms selling a product in the market. The owner of
the firm has hired you in order to delegate to you the decisions concerning the output of the
firm.
The method with which you will be compensated which you will have to take as given may
be of either type:
Contract Type 1: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a fixed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the firm’s profits and the firm’s revenues.
C1 = 20000 +
1
2
· (α ·Π + (1− α) ·Revenue)
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By choosing the value of alpha, the owner can vary the weight given to each one of the two
aforementioned objectives in the variable part of your compensation.
Contract Type 2: 20.000 experimental currency units (EXCUs) as a fixed salary plus half
of a linear combination between the firm’s profits and the difference between your firm’s and
the rival’s profits.
C2 = 20000 +
1
2
· (α ·Π + (1− α) · [Π−Πother])
By choosing the value of alpha, the owner can vary the weight given to each one of the two
aforementioned objectives in the variable part of your compensation.
When receiving this information you should have in mind that the owner’s earnings will be
a fixed amount of 20.000 EXCUs plus the firm’s profit.
The market will take place during 50 periods in each one of which you will have to make the
decision of your firm’s output. The contract concerning your compensation may be changed
every three periods during the first 30 periods and every period after period 30.
You will be assigned to a firm’s owner who will be randomly chosen once at the beginning
of the experiment. This matching will be kept constant throughout the session. The firm with
which your firm will be matched to form a market will be determined randomly in each period
among the rest of the firms formed by the participants in this session in the same way as your
firm.
Your objective is to maximize your cumulative compensation. The more EXCUs you earn
the higher will be your payment in cash at the end of the session. We give you a fixed initial
payment of 100.000 EXCUs which will be added to your earnings from the experiment. The
exchange rate is 1 euro for every 80,000 EXCUs.
Thank you for your participation and remember that, once these instructions are read, any
communication or action which is not controlled by the organizers is prohibited until payments
in cash have been made at the end of the experiment.
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